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THE LEGACY OF CLINICAL EDUCATION: THEORIES
ABOUT LAWYERING
CARRIE MENKEL- MEADOW*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE DEVELOPING CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION MOVEMENT has been con-
cerned with the central question "What is it that lawyers do?" This
query has elicited a variety of answers that suggest some new theories
about the role of the lawyer and the practice of law in contemporary
society.
Some of these theories are closely associated with individual pro-
ponents or schools of law while others are the product of collaborative
or anonymous effort. Clinicians have forged these new theories in an
e'ffort to incorporate the knowledge of those who have gone before them
with explanations of their own experiences and observations of their
own new reality. In order to fully understand the phenomenon of
lawyering, clinicians must now join a discourse with each other and with
other legal scholars and lawyers to enrich the inquiry into what lawyers
do and to consider which theories will most usefully explain lawyering
behavior.
In the hope of stimulating this discussion, this article will examine
some of the various schools of thought about what lawyers do. It is of-
fered as a commentary on the beginnning of a philosophy or sociology'
of lawyering that is derived from the clinical movement which will sur-
vive long after the pedagogical and political disputes about clinical
methodology have been resolved. This is a subjective study which incor-
porates my own interpretations of the concepts of the various schools of
thought. I describe the approaches to or theories about lawyering and
their "creators" as I know them, recognizing that some major theories,
schools and people may not for one reason or another have come to my
attention.! The schools of thought discussed may suffer from some
distortion' both in their description and their attributions. Yet, even a
*Acting Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. A.B., Bar-
nard College, Columbia Univ.; J.D., University of Pennsylvania.
' One commentator has called this the phenomenonology of what lawyers do.
See Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L.
REV. 487 (1980).
' This is one of the problems caused by the limited body of scholarly writing
in the clinical field. The reader may note that many of the sources cited herein
are "unpublished" or "forthcoming."
' This approach follows a now familiar tradition in legal scholarship-the
discussion of models or "ideal types" in legal analysis which may be used at least
for heuristic purposes, if not for total reliability of description. See, e.g., R.
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slightly distorted description of an approach to lawyering can help us to
frame and to respond to questions about the lawyer's function in a legal
system. Although there is controversy surrounding different views
about the pedagogy or methodology of clinical legal education,' the focus
of this discussion is on the theories of what it means to be a lawyer in
our legal system, as they have developed from the clinical experience.
II. TOWARD MACRO AND MICRO THEORIES OF LAWYERING
Most clinicians would probably agree that the core subject of instruc-
tion and interest is the role of the lawyer in employing the skills and
practices needed to advise and represent clients. Most clinicians would
not hesitate to add that the lawyer employs these skills in a highly
structured world commonly called "the legal system." Any inquiry into
what lawyers do must necessarily consider what the legal system per-
mits, demands, requires and provides. Thus, most theories,5 explana-
tions or descriptions of what lawyers do may be divided into two,
somewhat arbitrary, categories-micro theories, which focus on the role
and behaviors of the individual lawyer, and macro theories, which focus
on the lawyer's interaction with the legal system, and the impact of
lawyers on the larger world.
Obviously, long before the present clinical movement began, lawyers,
legal scholars, anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists exa-
mined these two aspects of lawyering.' But the clinical movement has
spurred a variety of new approaches to our understanding about the
role of the lawyer and the function of the legal system. Indeed, what has
characterized the thinking of clinicians has been the systematic scrutiny
of all aspects of the lawyering role and function-no matter how small
or large a slice of the lawyering process to be examined. This reflection
on and scrutiny of the lawyer's work has been undertaken out of
necessity as well as out of interest, for in order to teach students how to
UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Pro-
cedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29; R. Abel, Informal
Alternatives to Courts as a Mode of Legalizing Conflict (forthcoming, on file with
the author).
There is, aside from the arguments about simulation versus client-centered
clinical education and in-house versus out-of-house fieldwork programs, a bona
fide dispute about the existence of a discrete clinical methodology in legal educa-
tion. See Condlin, The Myth of the Clinical Methodology, 2 CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUC. PERSPECTIVE 9 (1978).
' The words "theories about lawyering" are used cautiously. The models,
explanations, conceptual frameworks or principles about lawyering described in
this essay may not rise to the level of theories in the most abstract sense of the
term. The reader may substitute any other term which more accurately reflects
his or her sense of the subject matter.
6 For a comprehensive guide to this literature, see Abel, The Sociology of
American Lawyers-A Bibliographic Guide, 2 LAW & POLICY Q. 335 (1980).
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be lawyers, clinicians have had to ask themselves what it is that lawyers
do.
As more and increasingly diversified people have asked themselves
questions about what lawyers do, certain theoretical patterns have
emerged. Those who focus on the micro or individual level of lawyering
emphasize the concepts of role and process, i.e., what does the lawyer
do, for whom, in what context, and why? Thus, for those using the
microscope, the lawyer is decision-maker, advisor,8 fact developer,9
advocate,"0 friend," investigator, 2 and organizer.13 Those who focus on
the macro level of lawyering have emphasized the concepts of function
and substance, i.e., what can law and lawyers accomplish? For them the
lawyer is seen as an instrument of dispute resolution," an agent of social
change,15 a medium for greater democratic participation," and as a
mechanism of social control and symbol of stylized ritual. 8
It is still too early to tell which theory or combination of theories best
explains the purposes and functions of the lawyer, but these theories
have stimulated some important questions. These common questions
focus not only on what lawyers do, but also on how lawyers learn, make
decisions, and interact with other participants in the legal system.
Other questions which are implicated in this inquiry are how well does
the lawyer perform her duties, how is the lawyer constrained by the
larger system in which she operates, for whom does the lawyer work, by
what rules or norms should the lawyer's work be governed and eval-
uated, how does the lawyer relate to the substantive law that is practiced
and to what end does the lawyer work. Many clinicials have addressed
these questions and offered interesting insights into the legal profes-
Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the
Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979); A. Amsterdam, Memorandum to
Stanford Law School Faculty (July 27, 1973).
s D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-
CENTERED APPROACH (1977); L. BROWN & E. DAUER, PLANNING BY LAWYERS:
MATERIALS ON A NON-ADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROCESS (1978).
1 See G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR
CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 304-05 (1978).
" Id. at 826-965.
" See Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
12 See G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 9, at 339-407.
" See Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970).
" See Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society, 8 LAW
& SOC. R. 217 (1973); R. Abel, supra note 3.
" See Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience,
34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 106 (1977); Rabin, Lawyers For Social Change: Perspec-
tives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1976).
16 See Wexler, supra note 13; R. Abel, supra note 3.
" See Bellow, supra note 15; Wexler, supra note 13.
'" See G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 9 at 2-34.
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sion. The following sections will examine micro and macro theories,
though categorization will at times seem artificial, and offer some sug-
gestions for further inquiry into the question of what lawyers do. We
may ultimately have more questions than answers, but that is how
theories are born and tested.
III. MICRO THEORIES: THE INDIVIDUAL LAWYER -PROFESSIONAL
SKILLS AND INTERPERSONAL PROCESS
A. The Notion of "Role" in Lawyering
No discussion about theories of lawyering could begin without
reference to Gary Bellow, generally regarded as the theoretical father
of clinical education. 9 Although Bellow has written on many aspects of
clinical education, including pedagogy,0 course description" and lawyer-
ing process," his writing on the individual lawyer level has been most
notable for the attention it pays to the notion of role. In a text written
with Beatrice Moulton, Bellow describes the effect of this notion on the
lawyer's identity:
In simple terms, a fully-socialized individual is one who is,
does, and believes pretty much what society asks him or her to
be, do and believe. The explanations focus on three key con-
cepts: role-a socially generated set of expectations about one's
behavior in specific situations; reference group-the audience
(or audiences) to whom one looks for approval, support, accep-
tance, reward and sanction; and ideology-the constellation of
beliefs, knowledge, and ideas which, in a given situation, serve
to justify, legitimate and explain both role definitions and the
allocation of reward and sanction power among reference
groups. In the legal system (or any system of social relation-
ships) role definitions, reference groups and ideology combine to
produce a distinct legal subculture which powerfully influences
the "professionalization" of young lawyers. Over time, profes-
sional roles become part (and sometimes a very large part) of
one's identity. 3
's William Pincus is generally credited with being the financial and instru-
mental father of clinical education.
' G. Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on
Clinical Methodology in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT (CLEPR,
1973).
21 Bellow & Johnson, Reflections on the University of Southern California
Clinical Semester, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 664 (1971).
2 G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 9.
' Id. at 11-12.
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Thus, the individual attorney must locate herself within a profes-
sional context, examine the expectations of her role and choose whether
or not to conform to those expectations. These role expectations are
derived from the individual lawyer's functions and purpose as perceived
by the lawyer herself, her peers, judges, clients and other members of
the community who constitute the reference group.
The separation of professional functions into discrete areas or pro-
cesses permits generalizations to be made about each of the functional
"hats" or roles that a lawyer must perform. Bellow and Moulton liken
the lawyer's roles to those of actors in a theatrical production.2 By
studying the character (ie., the part or role of interviewer in the initial
lawyer-client contact), the actor can master its constituent elements, its
essence and its gestalt, and thereby learn to perform the role." Thus, the
lawyer's professional life can be divided into distinct roles such as the
interviewer, 26 planner, 27 investigator,2 8 negotiator,' examiner or inter-
rogator," advocate, debater31 and counselor.2 In this way, the particular
skills or talents which are necessary for each role can be analyzed, con-
ceptualized, practiced and mastered.
When the various roles are dissected, patterns begin to emerge. For
example, as interviewer, investigator, negotiator and examiner, the
lawyer must ask questions. Recognition of this particular skill require-
ment enables the lawyer to categorize the types and kinds of questions
to ask in particular contexts. Thus, the "logic of question-framing" is
born as a conceptual model of what lawyers do. When should an open-
ended question be used? When is a leading question more appropriate?
What are the effects of such questions on information acquisition? How
does the form of question affect the client, the fact-finder and the
lawyer's conceptualization of what she does?
The lawyer, thus, begins to learn about what she does by considering
the roles she plays, examining what skills are necessary to play those
roles, analyzing the constitutent elements of those skills and finally,
evaluating which elements of each skill can be used for what purposes
and with what effects. This model of examining what a lawyer does is
simultaneously procedural, instrumental and evaluative. It causes the
lawyer or clinician to ask a series of analytic questions about what the
" Id. at XIX-XXV.
25 Id.
Id. at 104-272.
Id. at 273-429.
SId.
Id. at 430-606.
Id. at 607-825.
Id. at 826-965.
Id. at 966-1104.
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individual seeks to achieve, what is needed to accomplish these things
and how well adapted the means chosen are for the ends desired. The
Bellow and Moulton scheme of dividing the lawyering process into con-
stitutent roles, skills, models and issues proceeds in similar fashion for
all of the attorney functions.'
B. Conceptualization of the Lawyer's Skills
Perhaps the most sophisticated conceptualization of the lawyer's
skills has been undertaken by one of the other "elder" statesmen of the
clinical movement, David Binder, and his colleagues in the UCLA clini-
cal program.' In their view, the lawyer's role is simply, but effectively
to assist the client in the achievement of some client-defined goal.
Binder argues that the lawyer must develop the most effective skills
to effectuate the client's purpose. Thus, in the initial interview with a
client, the lawyer must provide the client with the opportunity to self-
define her goals and concerns. The lawyer must then employ her profes-
sional skills to learn the relevant facts in the most efficient and logical
manner." When the clinician considers how best to acquire these facts
in an initial client contact, she is conceptualizing about order, logic and
purpose. In the litigation context, it is likely that a particular transac-
tion, occurrence or event "caused" the litigation; therefore, the best way
to proceed in such an interview is to undertake an exhaustive chronolo-
gical exposition of the cause and its effects. 6 In the non-litigation con-
text, the facts might better be acquired in topical order. For example, in
estate planning the interview might focus first on family structures,
then on assets and finally on dispositional desires.
Similarly, in counseling, Binder argues that the lawyer must facilitate
the client's decision-making process" since the client must live most
I See notes 26-32 supra and accompanying text. In addition to this micro
analysis, Bellow and Moulton view the lawyering process as including a view of
the lawyer acting within a larger system, more specifically the profession's moral
and ethical constraints. These constraints may affect the attorney's sense of her
role, what skills will be used or not used and which means or ends will be per-
missible and which will not. Because this approach to the question of what a
lawyer does includes macro analysis, discussion will be deferred to that section.
See notes 82-92 infra and accompanying text.
Conversations I have had with Gary Bellow and Beatrice Moulton subsequent
to the publication of their book have led me to believe they would prefer to be
considered as expressing a more macro-societal and substance-oriented perspec-
tive and would now write a different book.
I The conception of and analysis for this article preceded my affiliation with
the UCLA clinical program. I must confess, however, to a possible bias in discuss-
ing the contributions of the UCLA clinicians since this article was written in the
shadow of the light of one year's influence.
D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 6-134.
8 Id. at 53-75.
8, Id. at 135-223.
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closely with the decision. With this purpose in mind the attorney can
use his or her skill and knowledge to assist the client in developing
the best data base from which to choose and assess the available alter-
natives. Thus, the lawyer will present the possible legal and economic
consequences of each alternative, while the client will present and
assess the personal and social consequences of each alternative. This
conceptualization of what the lawyer does and what she is trying to
accomplish permits categorization of tasks, duties, information and the
criteria for choosing from among the types of tasks, duties and informa-
tion.
This analysis has also been applied to the lawyer's role as advocate in
the decision-making process in which a fact-finder must choose between
two competing versions of the facts."8 By systematically exploring the
fact-finding mechanism, the clinician considers the lawyer's role in the
process. A close examination of this process reveals that the fact-finder
assimilates the factual presentations of a case to his knowledge and
experience of the world. Therefore, the lawyer must take care to pre-
sent the facts in terms of the premises or generalizations on which she
thinks the fact-finder bases his factual evaluations. If this is not poss-
ible, more proof, evidence or argument may be necessary to persuade
the fact-finder to accept a version of the facts based on a different set of
premises or generalizations, or the premises or generalizations may
themselves have to be modified.
With a similar modus operandi Paul Bergman has suggested an
approach to develop a sense of purpose in cross-examination. a9 Instead of
learning through the folklore of the discipline, clinical students should
be taught to think about their goals in cross-examination and to deduce
the principles by which to achieve them."' Thus, if the purpose of a
cross-examination is to develop evidence, proof, arguments or infer-
ences that support one view of the world rather than another, the
lawyer can begin to construct a logic of questioning that is informed by
a measurement or calculus of risk. Although an adverse witness may be
personally unknown to the cross-examiner, her relationship to one view
of the world can be anticipated (i.e., the opposing side's version of the
case). Thus, if the lawyer can rebut a "bad" answer by extrinsic
evidence from her own factual perspective (i.e., another person or an
inconsistent statement), a question to that witness will be relatively
safe. Bergman uses this reasoning to create a "safety model" for cross-
examination that helps the lawyer to understand her goals, and role as
8 D. Binder & W. Graham, Deductive Reasoning in the Proof of Facts (1979)
(on file with the author).
" Bergman, A Practical Approach to Cross-Examinationv Safety First, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 547 (1978).
41 Id. at 548-49.
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trial advocate, to conceptualize about a particular process, and to
evaluate her choices and performance."
The substantive principles described above are not nearly as signifi-
cant as the process by which they are derived. The lawyer's purpose,
role and skill-the components of her craft-are closely scrutinized, as if
looked at through a microscope. By focusing intently on the elements of
a particular role or skill, the clinician can frame concepts, generaliza-
tions and abstractions about that component of the lawyering process.
By asking what the lawyer does, for what purpose and in what context,
orienting models or conceptual frameworks can be developed for each of
the lawyer's diverse skills and roles. Criteria can then be articulated to
aid in making and evaluating behavioral choices.
These "models" of individual attorney skills are still in an early stage
of conceptualization and development. Yet they offer great promise for
explanations of lawyering behavior, not just for clinical instruction, but
for our understanding of what, why and how lawyers do what they do.42
C. Lawyer Decision-Making
Other clinicians such as Anthony Amsterdam43 have looked at the
lawyer's decisions as the unit of analysis:
What is the lawyer's role? What are the lawyer's goals? What
are the available means for attaining those goals? What are the
ingredients of judgment-of wise decision-making-in those
choices? How are the lawyer's role, goals, means and decision-
making processes affected by the structure of the legal institu-
tions within which he works? And: how did you act or decide?
What choices did that decision or action imply? What alter-
native courses were open? Why were they rejected, or not con-
sidered? In light of your objectives and resources, how could
your process of decision making and responsive action be
improved?44
This approach to studying lawyering behavior examines how choices
are made in particular situations, evaluates the decision-making process
" Id. at 555-75.
42 Other clinicians have also followed this method of analysis of the lawyer's
tasks. See, e.g., Schoenfield and Schoenfield, Interviewing and Counseling
Clients in A Legal Setting, 11 AKRON L. REV. 313 (1977); G. Lowenthal, A
General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy and Behavior (forthcoming, on
file with the author).
Anthony Amsterdam has written a number of articles concerning criminal
law. See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974). Beginning in 1972, while at Stanford, he undertook the
responsiblity for updating TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES.
" A. Amsterdam, Memorandum to Stanford Law School Faculty (July 27,
1973).
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and compares the decisions to alternative possibilities. This is similar to
the analysis that is utilized when one evaluates how a court arrived at a
particular result among competing choices as shaped by precedent, fac-
tual presentation, evidence and policy considerations.
The analysis of a lawyer's decisions can draw from the decision-mak-
ing literature in other disciplines" as well as from the numerous accounts
of legal strategies and choices in real cases.46 Theories can then be form-
ulated which tie together discernible patterns discovered in the
decision-making process.
The potential for such analysis, given the clinician's rootedness in
legal practice where scores of attorney decisions are made daily is enor-
mous. Clinicians who employ simulation methodologies have an unpar-
alleled opportunity to study and test the factors that affect lawyer
decision-making under almost perfect laboratory conditions. Indeed,
clinicians are in an excellent position to test theories about lawyer
behavior that come closest to the scientific method Langdell envisioned
for law study. 7 By observing simulated attorney interactions and tasks,
clinicians can begin to deduce patterns, rules and explanatory models of
lawyer decision-making. There is a possibility for a new empiricism
about lawyering that, while borrowing heavily from the Legal Realists,"
focuses more directly on lawyers who make millions of law-making, of-
fice49 and litigation decisions every day rather than on judges, legisla-
tures and agencies more commonly treated in the literature as legal
decision-makers.
Indeed, this focus on lawyer decision-making broadens our
understanding of how the legal system operates. If the analysis is to be
meaningful, such studies must consider: the fluidity of facts and infor-
mation at the lawyer's disposal; the impact of resource scarcity and
allocation decisions on the lawyer's choices; the input of clients, oppos-
ing counsel and judges into the individual attorney's choices; as well as
limitations based on substantive doctrine and professional norms. Thus,
by focusing on the lawyer's decisions as a question of theoretical in-
terest, clinicians can study not only how strategic choices are made, but
also the behavioral models and implications of decisions in the broader
context of the legal system. By closely examining the factors which in-
fluence an attorney in choosing between alternatives, such as whether
45 See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (1963); T. SORENSON,
DECISION MAKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE (1963); Simon, Rational Decision Making
in Business Organizations, 69 AMERICAN ECON. R. 493 (1979).
48 See, e.g., Meltsner, Litigating Against the Death Penalty: The Strategy
Behind Furman, 82 YALE L.J. 1111 (1973).
" See, e.g., Wizner and Curtis, Here's What We Do: Some Notes About
Clinical Legal Education, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 673 (1980).
41 Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the
Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 459 (1979).
" See generally L. BROWN & E. DAUER, supra note 8.
19801
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1980
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
to litigate or settle, and by extending the scrutiny to aggregates of at-
torney decisions, it is possible to learn a great deal about why lawyers
do what they do.
Working in this tradition of looking at attorneys as decision-makers,
at least one clinical scholar has begun to formulate some normative
ideas about how lawyers ought to make decisions.' Mark Spiegel has
argued that if the nature of the lawyer's work is to make decisions for
the client, the doctrine of informed consent, as applied to medical
decision-making, must also be applied to legal decision-making.' Thus, if
we focus on the content of the lawyer's decision it is too easy to
designate some decisions as strategic and therefore must be left to the
lawyer (such as the choice of forum, the proper legal claim to pursue,
whether to demand a jury, whether to ask a particular question or call a
particular witness) and others which involve the merits of the case and
must be left to the client (such as decisions to litigate or settle)." If a
client who participates in his case is more likely to achieve better
results, as at least one study seems to indicate,' then there are instru-
mental and practical reasons to look more closely at the allocation of
decision-making responsibility between lawyer and client. One can then
examine the economic and normative implications of who should make
what decisions in the lawyering context.
The importance of such theoretical inquires should not be underesti-
mated. The theoretical questions or visions of each clinican can and have
had a significant impact on the way law students and lawyers concep-
tualize and learn about the work and functions of a lawyer. Given an
emphasis on lawyer decision-making, students may learn to develop
models for learning how to make, evaluate and critique their own deci-
sions.5 Thus, students, lawyers and clinicians will ask of themselves,
throughout their careers, the questions posed in Amsterdam's
memorandum.56 From these inquiries, patterns and themes of attorney
decision-making can be explored in the academy, the classroom and in
the legal arena.
o See Spiegel, supra note 7.
Id. at 49-67, 123-133.
' See ABA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC7-7 (1978).
1 D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT - WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974).
1 The ABA has recently attempted to adopt a clinical model for teaching
young lawyers. See COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, ABA PILOT
LAWYERING SKILLS INSTITUTE (1979-80).
" See, e.g., the description of the University of Pennsylvania's clinical pro-
gram in Spiegel, The Penn Legal Assistance Office: Theory and Practice in
Learning and Lawyering, 13 THE LAW ALUMNI J. (1978-79) (University of Penn-
sylvania Law School).
I See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
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D. Lawyering As An Interpersonal Process
When clinicians have asked the question, "What is it that lawyers do?",
perhaps the most controversial answer has been that "lawyers interact
with other people." In a growing body of literature, most clearly
represented in the writings of the Columbia Law School's clinicians,57
Thomas Shaffer," Gary Goodpaster' 9 and various psychiatrists and
psychologists who have worked with clinicians,"0 the lawyer's roles have
been described as interpersonal processes, characterized by interactions
with lawyers, clients, judges and other actors in the legal system. At
least one commentator has criticized this "psychologizing" of the
lawyering process."1 Yet this view of the lawyering process may also
prove productive in analyzing reasons or explanations for what a lawyer
does.
Many of these interpersonal theories of lawyering are derived from
already existing theories of human and professional interaction
developed in social psychology and sociology." Indeed, the development
of analogous theories in medical sociology6" has far surpassed the for-
mulation and acceptance of similar theories in the legal world. Whether
I I have identified the Columbia clinicians as Michael Meltsner, Philip
Schrag, Holly Hartstone, and Jack Himmelstein, among others. See notes 69-70
infra and accompanying text for some of their writings.
8 T. SHAFFER, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELLING (1976).
5 Goodpaster, The Human Arts of Lawyering, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5 (1975).
60 See, e.g., Redmount, Attorney Personalities and Some Psychological
Aspects of Legal Consultation, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 972 (1961); Redmount, Human-
istic Law Through Legal Counseling, 2 CONN. L. REV. 98 (1965); Watson, Some
Psychological Aspects of Teaching Professional Responsibility, 16 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 1 (1963).
61 Simon, supra note 1. While I share some of Simon's views I believe he has
committed the intellectual error of reductionism. As set forth, the "interpersonal
process" theory of lawyering is only one of the theories being considered and
developed by American clinicians. The impact of Rogerian therapeutic models of
lawyering has been exaggerated by Simon. Id. at 51-52 n.93. It is my experience
that to the extent such formulations are used at all, they are used in the inter-
viewing segments of clinical courses. Yet, the more common model of clinical
education is skills training as described in Section IB in the text. See notes 34-42
supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, the interpersonal school has been
the most prolific in its writing, and thereby disproportionately represents the
clinical theories about lawyering that have been published. See, supra note 2.
This is not to deny or minimize the importance of this school of thought. The
significance of caring for our fellow human beings in our service to them should
never recede from the professional consciousness.
62 See, e.g., the symbolic interactionist school of sociology: E. GOFFMAN, THE
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959); E. GOFFMAN, STRATEGIC INTER-
ACTION (1968).
63 See, e.g., the works of Eliot Friedson: E. FRIEDSON, DOCTORING TOGETHER
(1975); E. FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE (1970).
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derived from humanistic psychology ," more traditional Freudian
psychology15 or sociology," the common themes in these theories about
the human interaction in the lawyer-client relationship, are the recogni-
tion of human needs to be satisfied, both on the part of the lawyer and
the client, the need for effective communication skills, acknowledgment
and tolerance of values, goals and purposes held by others, 7 and the
recognition of the role of feelings in what we otherwise think of as a "ra-
tional" legal system. 8
In their written works concerning the Columbia Law School's clinical
program, Meltsner and Schrag have described the use of group dyna-
mics theory and practice as a means of focusing on the lawyer's inter-
actions with others. 9 Their conviction that it is important for lawyers to
step back and reflect on how they interact with others led them to test
their theories by attempting replication or simulation of the human
dynamics of the attorney-as-negotiator role in the student-teacher rela-
tionship. The student is required to negotiate for instructor supervi-
sion and, in so doing, is expected to abstract and generalize from this
experience in order to generate principles which will lead to a suc-
cessful negotiation with opposing counsel. Thus, the student learns to
share information, to express needs, to bargain for what the other side
desires and to confirm agreements.
By focusing on the attorney-client interpersonal process, clinicians
have developed theories about what motivates participants in the legal
system,"1 what lawyers are able to do and what must or might be left to
others. This focus on the interpersonal process of lawyering has obvious
4 See C. ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON (1961); Himmelstein, Reassessing
Law Schooling: An Inquiry Into The Application of Humanistic Educational
Psychology to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 514 (1978).
65 See Watson, supra note 50.
66 See E. GOFFMAN, supra note 62; E. FRIEDSON, supra note 63.
67 See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8 at 6-7.
I have always disliked the distinction between the rational mode (thought,
idea) and the irrational or arational mode (emotion, feeling). If feelings are appro-
priate to the situation-e.g., grief after death-then they are quite rational.
Similarly, we have long had an emotional attachment to our ideas. For further
discussion of these views see C. Menkel-Meadow, Women As Law Teachers:
Toward the Feminization of Legal Education, in MONOGRAPH III HUMANISTIC
EDUCATION IN LAW (Columbia Univ. 1980).
69 M. MELTSNER & P. SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY: MATERIALS FOR
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION (1974); M. MELTSNER & P. SCHRAG, TOWARD SIMULA-
TION IN LEGAL EDUCATION (1979); Meltsner and Schrag, Report from a CLEPR
Colony, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 581 (1976); Meltsner and Schrag, Scenes from a Clinic,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1978).
70 Meltsner and Schrag, Scenes from a Clinic, supra note 69 at 21-25.
71 D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8; Goodpaster, supra note 59; T. SHAFFER,
supra note 49.
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implications for determining what is lawyer's work."2 But, aside from the
now trite question about whether a lawyer can or should be a social
worker or psychiatrist, this aspect of the lawyer's work is in many ways
most complex,"3 and very intimately related to questions not only of pro-
fessional role or status but to issues of professional ethics and liability
as well." To what extent should lawyers be liable for their failures at
interpersonal relations in the lawyer-client context, especially where
such failures of communication have led to unsuccessful and perhaps
preventable legal or judgmental errors? To what standard of care, train-
ing and expertise should lawyers be held in all of their interpersonal
roles-advisor, counselor, negotiator, friend, etc. It is certainly impor-
tant to look at these questions, speculate on the possibilities and ask
other actors in the legal system-clients, judges, opposing counsel and
adversary parties-what is expected or desired as clinicians formulate
standards for professional conduct. Examination of one's professional
self-concept and behavioral standards both as teachers and as students
can only result in more effective delivery of legal services by forcing
more honest appraisals of our professional identities."4
Thus, as is the case with all of the questions posed by the micro-
theories of lawyering, when we examine the question of what a lawyer
does, the answers are not really as limited, instrumental or indivi-
dualistic as they might seem. In the interpersonal process school of
clinical education, the questions asked are not only what will work best
for this lawyer with this client, but also how should the attorney act
with her clients and adversaries, and what are the implications for such
theories of interaction for the legal profession at large. In short, when
analyzing the means used by lawyers in interactions with others, we
must inevitably come to grips with what ends will be served as indivi-
dual attorney interactions aggregate and proliferate out into the larger
system. Clinicians, by being in a position to critically observe a large
and yet controlled number of interactions, have an ideal vantage point
for reflection on the dynamics of the lawyering process and its impli-
cations for the legal system.
72 Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK (1967).
" It is not unlike deciding when a lawyer ceases to be a lawyer, and begins to
act as a business partner or advisor.
7 G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 58-59 (1978).
" This seems particularly appropriate at this time since the proposed ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct divide the lawyer's ethical obligations into
categories, defined, in large part, by the interpersonal processes in which the
lawyer is engaged. See ABA, PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT (1980); Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics (1980), ABF.
RESEARCH J. (1980).
76 See L. DVORKIN, J. HIMMELSTEIN & H. LESNICK, BECOMING A LAWYER: A
HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY
(1980).
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E. The Meta-Learning of Lawyering
The work of Robert Condlin and others at the Harvard clinical pro-
gram, while associated with the Harvard School of Education, 77 while
most often associated with the pedagogical and methodological theories
and debates about clinical education, also contributes to the "micro"
theories of lawyering. One of Condlin's major theories is that law
students learn how to learn in the law school in a competitive and per-
suasive mode rather than in a collaborative and additive mode.78 This
learning mode replicates itself as law students learn each new aspect of
their lawyering roles-how to brief and argue cases, how to argue with
their professors and later their judges, how to communicate with their
classmates and later their peers in the legal system, how to deal with
more material than can possibly be absorbed and later how to handle
cases that could fill up more than all of the available time. 79 Thus, if we
look at the learning process of lawyering we will learn not only how to
structure curricula but also how the socialization of the law school and
its teaching is replicated and patterned in the socialization of the legal
system and its participants. Clinicians, by examining their own pro-
cesses as legal educators, can generalize and theorize about how their
students will behave as lawyers. Learning becomes a metaphor for
lawyering. Because the professional behavior of lawyers as practitioners
is patterned on their prior learning experience, the present learning
experience can be seen as establishing patterns for subsequent profes-
sional behavior as practitioners and educators. The practitioner acts as
an educator when, for example, a counseling session becomes one in
which the lawyer "educates" the client about available alternatives.
This process contains the same manipulative potential that the teacher
may use on the student for educational purposes. In similar fashion the
lawyer may educate judges in court appearances, opposing counsel in
negotiating sessions, and ultimately herself in general practice. Thus,
this "school" of clinical thought looks at lawyering as a process within a
system which, by its nature, structures learning and thereby shapes the
behavioral repertoire.
F. Summary
From the above discussion, certain common themes that have
emerged from the "micro" theories of lawyering can be identified. While
micro theories focus on the individual lawyer's behavior and roles, they
1 Described by Bolman, Learning and Lawyering: An Approach to Education
in Legal Practice in ADVANCE IN EXPERIENTIAL SOCIAL PROCESSES (Cooper and
Aldererfer eds. 1979).
71 Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for Learning in
Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 MD. L. REV. 223 (1981).
79 Id.
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must of necessity confront the "macro" implications of how the legal
system will be effected by aggregations and proliferations of individual
attorney behavioral choices. Thus, if the unit of analysis is theories about
how an individual attorney negotiates, one must account for the limita-
tions of this particular role or function within the legal system. What
skills the attorney will employ (making a first offer, making principled
movements)," what interpersonal processes the attorney will employ
(reasonable or unreasonable behavior, cooperative or competitive style),
how the attorney will educate herself, and her opposing counsel about
the case, what decisions the attorney will make and why, are decisions
which will necessarily be affected by the legal context in which they are
made. 1 Inevitably, the attorney must determine what she is trying to
accomplish in the case, how the legal system permits or limits achieve-
ment of such goals, and what impact the choices made in this case will
have on future choices to be made by other lawyers in other cases.
Whether the micro theorists address these latter questions directly
or leave them to the macro theorists, it is useful to our understanding of
what lawyers do that such questions be examined, tested, written about,
and ultimately taught to our students. For as legal education and legal
scholarship has thus far focused on theories of institutional decision-
making and choices, the focus on individual lawyer choices, decisions
and behaviors described by clinical micro theorists will add to our
understanding of the legal system.
III. MACRO THEORIES: THE LEGAL PROFESSION-OF
PURPOSES, POWER, STRUCTURE AND SUBSTANCE
In studying what lawyers do, some clinicians have begun to analyze
the larger impact of the aggregate of attorney functions. What does the
legal profession provide for society? What can a lawyer do for her client
that cannot be done as well by the client himself? Once again, the clini-
cian has an excellent vantage point from which to ask such questions
and examine the answers. As both a working professional and a scholar
or expert on the legal system, the clinician can view the aggregate
impact of the individual lawyer on the legal system and, conversely, the
legal system on the lawyer. Indeed, the clinician is ideally situated in
time and place to develop a legal sociology or anthropology utilizing a
combination of theoretical and empirical explorations in the fieldwork
necessarily engaged in by most clinical programs. What then do clini-
cians have to say about the operation of the legal system from their
perspective as philosophers-servants?
' C. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation (unpub-
lished, on file with author).
81 Such as whether the negotiation is prelitigation or not. Schwartz, The Pro-
fessionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669 (1978).
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A. Purpose -Resolving Disputes, Planning Transactions
or Effecting Social Change?
Those who have written about the appropriate function of the lawyer
have argued that the lawyer is a loyal friend to her particular client, or a
facilitator of the client's wishes, an agent of needed social change, a
planner of transactions, or a dispute resolver. The arguments continue
within the curricula of most clinical programs but without much edifica-
tion by those who are best able to analyze lawyers' actions and com-
ment on their effectiveness. The current trend in legal scholarship
appears to be the comparison of the adversary system82 with more par-
ticipatory and less antagonistic systems of justice and dispute resolu-
tion.83 Too little is heard about the purpose or functions of the legal
system from those who have the best data base from having par-
ticipated in, and have trained students to participate in, the legal
system.
Bellow's clinical teaching, unlike that of other clinicians, has been in-
spired by a political vision. He has come from the legal services and
public defender tradition84 and views law as a means for promoting more
justice in our world-economic, political and social-particularly on
behalf of the poor and under-represented. Bellow's recent writing and
work8 5 has been devoted to maximizing the effectiveness of achieving
these ends. In describing the patterns of legal service practice, Bellow
finds that the practice has become routinized; clients are being
manipulated 8 into accepting minimal results; settlements, acquiescence
and conciliation are the norm rather than protest and contested law-
suits; and that lawyers fail to exercise their creative skills to engage in
preventive law but rather focus exclusively on the initial problem
presented to them. 7 Although Bellow is critical, he offers solutions for
how lawyers might be more effective-solutions which come from a
slightly broader and expanded notion of the skills he teaches clinical
students. Lawyers must aggregate their clients, not necessarily in the
legal class action form, but by analyzing patterns that exist in the legal
problems they present.8 Lawyers must adopt new strategies for select-
82 See M. SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1979); Simon,
supra note 3.
R. Abel, supra note 3.
CLEPR, FOURTH BIENNIAL REPORT 1975-76 (1976).
See G. Bellow, Proposal for Legal Services Institute (1978) (on file with
author).
" Goffman terms this process of manipulation as being "cooled." See E.
GOFFMAN, supra note 62.
87 Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34
NLADA BRIEFCASE 106, 108-09 (1977).
" Id. at 119-22.
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ing the cases they work on and what remedies they seek. They must ask
themselves what they are trying to accomplish in larger terms for their
clients rather than mechanistically apply their skills. They must
perhaps learn new skills-organizing their clients, aggregating claims
without using class actions-and reconsider their roles within the pro-
fession. Both in the Lawyering Process text,"9 co-authored with Beatrice
Moulton, and in a subsequent article co-authored with Jeanne Kettle-
son,9" Bellow explores how the contours and requirements of the Code of
Professional Responsibility may affect such an expanded notion of the
function of the legal services lawyer.
Bellow's focus on the political nature of lawyering and its direct rela-
tionship to the maldistribution of resources in this country, has been
echoed by nonclinical authors writing on the connections between the
social and legal structures. 1 Thus, Bellow's writings and thought forces
one to step back from the micro view of an individual attorney in his
role in solving client problems or planning transactions, and asks us to
consider what purpose is served by what lawyers do. The lawyer's role
and function in society must be vigorously debated as we develop
theories and methods for teaching law students to be lawyers.2
B. The Clinical Study of Legal Institutions and Substantive Law
Many years ago, the Legal Realist movement attempted to close the
gap between the law that is studied-appellate decisions-and the law
that exists in actual practice-trial courts and law offices-by initiating
studies of the legal system through both theoretical works" and empiri-
cal studies. 4 One might expect that clinicians would continue this tradi-
tion since it affords students of the legal system a unique opportunity to
study the law, observe its application in action, and examine its impact
on the protected classes, prohibited actors, enforcers and clientele
affected by the laws.9 5
While some clinical programs have combined a study of substantive
89 G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra, note 9.
® Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and
Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 337.
91 Simon, supra note 1. See also J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976); R. Abel, supra note 3.
92 Other authors addressing the question of the appropriate function of the
lawyer have argued that the lawyer is merely a facilitator of the client's wishes.
See T. SHAFFER, supra note 58; Fried, supra note 11; Binder, supra note 8.
13 J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1969).
" Schlegel, supra note 48.
9 For one suggestion of how this might work, see Sparer, The Responsibility
of Law Teachers, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 602 (1978).
1980]
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1980
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
doctrine with field work experience," few have utilized the opportunity
to do more than study, in traditional fashion, the policy considerations
implicated in legal doctrines. 7 Instead, the clinician's skills would be
better employed by analyzing the impact particular rules have on the
people involved with that body of law. 8 Thus, a discussion of the policy
considerations connected with employer financed unemployment com-
pensation programs might also consider the effects of such financing on
the burden of proof, motivation to contest a determination, appearances
at the hearings, control over the production of evidence and recovery
rates.9 In this way the clinician could bridge the gap between the law as
written and the law as experienced by the actors in the legal system.
Our understanding of the role of law and lawyer in society would be
broadened by a sustained and rigorous analysis of the relationship of
the different levels of the legal system to each other.
These suggestions have implications not only for the development of
clinical themes in scholarship, but for the nature of clinical education as
well. Most modern clinical programs will be forced to decide between
two lines of development; to offer traditional process or skills courses,
such as interviewing, negotiation, counselling and trial advocacy, or to
develop substantive courses with clinical or fieldwork components,
where the primary purpose is the study of the law and its doctrine in
the context of the relevant legal institutions. Obviously, the two ap-
proaches are not mutually exclusive, but where resources are scarce
and there is a desire for planned programatic and intellectual develop-
ment, the choice may have to be made.
C. The Clinician as Empiricist
As an instructor and practitioner, the clinician has a unique oppor-
tunity to study the legal profession as an ethnomethodologist-that is, a
participant observer.' The clinician, by observing and capturing
thousands of data on the legal profession every year, has a rich oppor-
tunity for a systematic behavioral examination of the participants in
and the structure of the legal system. The case study analysis of legal
services work by Bellow and Kettleson is one example of such work.'
Clinical courses at various law schools (ie., New York University, University
of California at Los Angeles, Rutgers, Ohio State, Columbia, Stanford) have been
offered in the substantive areas of Criminal Law, Consumer Law, Welfare Law,
Administrative Law, and Women's Rights, to name a few.
" See, e.g., Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational Harms
Caused by Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. L. REV. 641 (1978).
98 See, e.g., J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 111-51 (1976).
" See Lesnick, Reassessing Law Schooling: The Sterling Forest Group, 53
N.Y.U.L. REV. 565 (1978).
100 H. SCHWARTZ & J. JACOBS, QUALITATIVE METHODS IN SOCIOLOGY (1979).
"I G. Bellow and J. Kettleson, Criteria for Case File Evaluation (on file with
the author).
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Evaluation studies of lawyer practice routines and alternative forms or
types of practice is another example. In my own empirical work, I am
studying how attorneys in a nonmarket context (legal services attor-
neys) allocate scarce legal resources."' There are a variety of such ques-
tions which could be subjected to this rigorous field and empirical
analysis by clinicians with available data bases. Clinicians need only ask
the right, ie., most interesting questions, about lawyers and our legal
system and then operationalize those questions in the field.
D. Professional Norms: Ethical and Moral Codes
Given the timeliness and significance of questions about our rules of
legal ethics,"3 clinicians would seem to be particularly well qualified to
offer analyses and suggestions for appropriate rules of conduct appli-
cable to different kinds of lawyering situations. The work of Bellow and
Moulton,' Bellow and Kettleson,"' and Spiegel' 0 seems to point us in
this direction. Yet clinicians still need to consider whether the
categories of lawyering functions and clientele served established by
the present Code or the proposed Model Rules0 ' adequately provides
for the diversity of legal functions, professional services and client
needs. At the very least, the subject matters and geographic areas we
serve may reveal useful information about the allocation of legal ser-
vices. Although clinicians can prepare law students to work in areas of
greatest need this is only part of our function. Clinical teachers and
scholars should also explore alternative methods of delivering legal ser-
vices and of structuring our profession, particularly in controversial
areas such as judicare,0 8 mandatory pro bono work,"9 and lay or
paralegal representation projects. There is no end to the policy issues
effecting the practice of law that clinicians might profitably and intelli-
gently address.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
This essay has examined the contributions that have come from
various clinical "schools of thought" to the theories about lawyering.
These can be broadly categorized by their emphasis on the role of the
10 Menkel-Meadow and Meadow, The Allocation of Legal Resources in a Non-
Market Context, NSF Grant #SES-8020373 (July 1, 1980).
103 New rules of professional conduct are presently being considered. See note
109 infra and accompanying text.
104 G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 9.
105 G. BELLOW AND J. KETTLESON, supra note 101.
10 Spiegel, supra note 7.
0 See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
100 S. BRAKEL, JUDICARE PUBLIC FUNDS, PRIVATE LAWYERS AND POOR PEOPLE
(1974); LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DELIVERY SYSTEMS STUDY (1980).
109 ABA, PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1980).
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individual attorney or on the profession in general. Although the line of
demarcation between "micro" and "macro" theories of lawyering is arti-
ficially drawn, it is useful for clinicians to identify the academic and prac-
tical issues the discipline raises, and thereby to determine which themes
or disciplines the clinician can comfortably address.
While the exclusive focus on Maslowian survivial needs11° may not be
totally supplanted, the time has come for clinicians to address the
serious issues of the process and substance of lawyering. The time has
come to share what has been learned from clinical programs with both
fellow clinicians and other members of the legal profession. Although
the clinical movement has come of age as an educational medium, it
remains in its infancy in legal scholarship. This is especially true of its
potential contribution to a better understanding of the lawyer's role in
contemporary society. If there is any legacy clinicians can offer to the
future of legal education, it is to encourage the study of lawyering as a
subject worthy of serious inquiry in our institutions of legal education.
Although clinicians may on occasion disagree with one another and with
non-clinical legal educators, the free exchange of ideas should foster a
climate of experimentation and intellectual growth that will promote
the development of more informed and effective teachers and practi-
tioners.
110 For too long clinicians have been focused on their "lower" survival needs,
and have neglected the expression of their "higher" aspirations and values. A.
MASLOW, THE FARTHER REACHES OF HUMAN NATURE (1971).
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